INHALT

Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1469 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.30743 (2012/C) (ex N 138/10) — Germany — Financing of infrastructure projects at Leipzig/Halle airport (2) (notified under document C(2014) 5071) (Only the English text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2015/1469
of 23 July 2014
on State aid SA.30743 (2012/C) (ex N 138/10) — Germany — Financing of infrastructure projects at Leipzig/Halle airport (2)
(notified under document C(2014) 5071)
(Only the English text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
1.
PROCEDURE
2.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES
2.1. BACKGROUND TO THE INVESTIGATION AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT
2.1.1.
Leipzig/Halle airport
2.1.2.
The overview of the infrastructure investment programme
2.2. MEASURES UNDER INVESTIGATION AND GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
2.2.1.
Shareholder loans in favour of FLH
2.2.2.
Capital injections into FLH
2.2.3.
Compatibility of aid
3.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY
3.1. CONTEXT OF THE INVESTIGATED MEASURES
3.2. NOTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND PUBLIC POLICY REMIT
3.2.1.
Notion of economic activity and applicability of State aid rules to airport infrastructure
3.2.2.
Public policy remit
3.3. FINANCING OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH FLH’S SHAREHOLDER LOANS
3.3.1.
Financing conditions
3.3.2.
Application of market comparators to identify the market rate of FLH
3.3.3.
Credit rating of MFAG/FLH
Table 4
Rating of MFAG in 2006-12
3.3.4.
Loss given default (LGD) assessment
3.3.5.
No advantage gained from capital injections
3.4. COMPATIBILITY OF AID
3.4.1.
Well-defined objective of common interest
3.4.2.
Need for State intervention
3.4.3.
Appropriateness of the aid measure
3.4.4.
Incentive effect
3.4.5.
Proportionality of the aid (aid limited to the minimum)
3.4.6.
Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade between Member States
4.
COMMENTS FROM THIRD PARTIES
4.1. MITTELDEUTSCHE AIRPORT HOLDING (MFAG)
4.1.1.
Notion of economic activity and public policy remit
4.1.2.
Market conformity of FLH’s shareholder loans
4.1.3.
Compatibility of the aid
4.2. ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT DEUTSCHER VERKEHRSFLUGHÄFEN (ADV)
4.3. DEUTSCHE FLUGSICHERUNG (DFS)
4.4. SHAREHOLDER OF MFAG OR/AND FLH
4.4.1.
Landkreis Nordsachsen
4.4.2.
Stadt Dresden
4.4.3.
Stadt Leipzig
4.5. AIR CARGO FORWARDERS AND EXPRESS PARCEL DELIVERY COMPANIES
4.5.1.
European Air Transport Leipzig (EAT)
4.5.2.
Lufthansa Cargo
4.5.3.
Emons Spedition
4.5.4.
Spero Logistics Europe
4.5.5.
Deutsch Russische Wirtschaftsallianz e.V. (German-Russian Economic Alliance)
4.5.6.
Other freight forwarders and associations
4.6. PASSENGER AIRLINES AND TOURISM ASSOCIATIONS
4.6.1.
Germanwings
4.6.2.
Other airlines and tourism associations
4.7. UNDERTAKINGS LOCATED IN THE PROXIMITY OF THE AIRPORT AND ASSOCIATIONS
4.7.1.
BMW Werk Leipzig (BMW)
4.7.2.
EADS Elbe Flugzeugwerke (EADS)
4.7.3.
European Energy Exchange AG (EEX)
4.7.4.
Industrie- und Handelskammer Halle-Dessau (Halle-Dessau Chamber of Trade and Industry) (IHK)
4.7.5.
Other associations
4.8. SCHKEUDITZ CITIZENS’ ‘ANTI-NOISE’ INITIATIVE
5.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY ON THIRD PARTY COMMENTS
6.
ASSESSMENT
6.1. NOTION OF UNDERTAKING AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
6.1.1.
Notion of undertaking
6.1.2.
Activities falling within public policy remit
6.1.3.
Conclusion
6.2. AID NATURE OF THE SHAREHOLDER LOANS IN FAVOUR OF FLH
6.2.1.
Relation between the shareholder loans and the capital injections
6.2.2.
Economic advantage
6.2.3.
Conclusion
6.3. AID NATURE OF THE CAPITAL INJECTIONS IN FAVOUR OF FLH
6.3.1.
State resources and imputability to the State
6.3.2.
Economic advantage
6.3.3.
Selectivity
6.3.4.
Distortion of competition and effect on trade
6.3.5.
Conclusion
6.4. LAWFULNESS OF THE AID
6.5. COMPATIBILITY OF AID
6.5.1.
The applicable legal framework
6.5.2.
Compatibility assessment
6.5.2.1.
Contribution to a well-defined objective of common interest
6.5.2.2.
Need for State intervention
6.5.2.3.
Appropriateness of the aid measure
6.5.2.4.
Incentive effect
6.5.2.5.
Proportionality of the aid (aid limited to the minimum)
6.5.2.6.
Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade between Member States
6.5.2.7.
Transparency of aid
6.5.3.
Conclusion
7.
CONCLUSION
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3